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I.

INTRODUCTION

Dan Baker was a healthy, athletic, young man when he first
enrolled at the University of St. Thomas in Saint Paul, Minnesota.1
Instead of drinking or partying, Dan spent his time playing baseball
and hockey.2 While enrolled, he suffered a minor back injury and
was prescribed opioid painkillers.3 At that time, he had no idea about
the addiction and substance abuse that would ensue.
Dan’s parents first became aware there was a problem when his
girlfriend expressed concern that Dan was shutting himself in his
room and not attending class.4 Soon after, Dan’s parents began
accompanying him to follow-up doctor’s visits, only to discover that
Dan had been “doctor shopping,”5 a process whereby opioid addicts
see different physicians to get the quantity and type of pain pills they
desire.6 Dan’s family tried to help with his addiction, but they were
unsuccessful. When Dan was no longer able to obtain prescriptions,
he began to buy pills off the street.7
Dan eventually enrolled in a rehab center in Granite Falls,
Minnesota, where he found sobriety and employment; he later got a
1. Jon Collins, Son’s Overdose Death Drives This Minnesota Legislator’s Work, MPR
NEWS (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/04/18/opioid
-profiles-dave-baker.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Neha Casturi, Comment, A Modern Day Apocalypse: The Pill Mill Epidemic,
How It Took Texas by Storm, and How Texas Is Fighting Back, 14 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J.
445, 447 (2013) (quoting Cindy Horswell, “Pill Mill” Crackdown Nears Legislative
Approval,
HOUS.
CHRON.
(May
26,
2011,
5:30
AM),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Pill-mill-crackdown-nears
-legislative-approval-1603524.php) (defining “pill mills” as large networks of doctors
and pharmacists who fill prescriptions for “doctor shoppers,” who are individuals
who “fraudulently acquire large doses of dangerous controlled substances from
multiple clinics for use at the same time without disclosing the other prescriptions”).
7. Collins, supra note 1.
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room at a halfway house in Rochester, Minnesota.8 This newfound
sobriety was short-lived, however, because soon thereafter Dan was
laid off from his new job and began experimenting with heroin.9 Dan
re-enrolled in the rehab center but was kicked out after sharing
medication with his roommate.10
Dan’s family was vacationing in California when he called to
inform them he had been kicked out of rehab, but he assured them
he would be okay until the family returned home.11 Unfortunately,
Dan was wrong. That evening, Dan and a friend bought heroin in
Minneapolis and returned to the friend’s home in Maplewood, a
nearby suburb.12
The next morning, Dan’s parents flew back to Minnesota and,
upon their arrival, received a message that Dan had died of a heroin
overdose.13 A few years later, Dan’s father, Dave Baker, was elected
to the Minnesota House of Representatives, where he is currently
working to expand opioid addiction programs as a memorial to his
son.14
Another Minnesotan recently died of an opioid overdose; only
this time, his death garnered national attention. In April 2016, the
famous musician Prince was found dead in his home due to an
overdose on the opioid fentanyl.15 Fentanyl is a dangerous drug,
more potent than both heroin and morphine.16 Further,
investigators have learned from family members that Prince had a
decades-long history of opioid abuse, mainly Percocet, “to help him
deal with the rigors of performing.”17 Investigators revealed that pills
containing fentanyl were found in a bottle marked hydrocodone,

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Stephen Montemayor, Pills Seized from Paisley Park Contained Illicit Fentanyl,
Same Drug That Killed Prince, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2016, 9:15 PM),
http://www.startribune.com/pills-seized-from-paisley-park-contained-illicit
-fentanyl-same-drug-that-killed-prince/390816101/
(stating
that
although
investigators believe Prince unknowingly took the drug, they are still uncertain).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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and they believe the mislabeling caused Prince to unknowingly
ingest the opioid.18
Unfortunately, stories similar to Dan’s and Prince’s have
become increasingly common across Minnesota and the nation.
Since 1999, deaths from opioid overdoses have steadily risen and
show little sign of slowing down.19 At the same time, the amount of
opioid prescriptions has quadrupled, and in 2014, for the first time,
deaths from opioid overdoses surpassed deaths from car crashes.20
Why has this become a problem? For one, opioids are extremely
addictive.21 Opioids increase dopamine levels in the brain, causing a
person to experience more cravings.22 Overdoses occur when
someone takes a dosage his or her body is not used to, which is why
buying prescription opioids off the street is particularly dangerous,
since no one can be certain of the dosage or purity of the drug.23
When an overdose occurs, an individual’s respiratory system shuts
down, essentially causing the body to forget to breathe.24
State and federal governments responded to this crisis with
legislation aimed at curbing opioid abuse.25 Though well-intended,
the current legislation may have developed a perfect storm for a
crisis. This Note begins by providing a history of opioid usage
throughout the world and outlining opioid regulations in the United
States during the past century.26 Next, this Note examines statistics
demonstrating the current state of opioid abuse.27 This is followed
18. See id.
19. See Jon Collins, Here’s Why Minnesota Has a Big Problem with Opioid Overdoses,
MPR NEWS (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/04/18/opioid
-overdose-epidemic-explained.
20. See Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths—United
States, 2000–2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1378, 1379, 1381 (2016).
21. See Collins, supra note 19.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See What Is the Federal Government Doing to Combat the Opioid Abuse Epidemic?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 114th Cong. 45–53 (2015) (statement of Nora D. Volkow, Director,
Nat’l
Inst.
on
Drug
Abuse)
[hereinafter
Volkow],
http://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities/testimony-to-congress
/2016/what-federal-government-doing-to-combat-opioid-abuse-epidemic
(outlining some of the programs governments have undertaken to address opioid
abuse).
26. See infra Sections II.A–B.
27. See infra Section II.C.1.
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by an examination of the pain management standards from The
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(TJC),28 the recent guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC),29 and the effect of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) on the opioid abuse epidemic.30 This Note then discusses
current federal and state combative measures31 and analyzes the
effectiveness of the patient satisfaction survey requirement under
the ACA and TJC’s pain management standard.32 Finally, this Note
will look at the effectiveness of both state prescription drug
monitoring programs (PDMPs)33 and naloxone distribution
programs.34 In sum, this Note argues that although current
combative measures have had a positive impact on decreasing
prescription opioid abuse, major change will not occur until patient
satisfaction surveys are removed from the ACA altogether or
penalties from low scores are lessened and TJC’s pain management
standard is clarified.35
II. FROM GENERAL ACCEPTANCE TO HEAVY REGULATION: HOW THE
HISTORY OF OPIOID USE HAS SHAPED OPIOID REGULATION TODAY
Opioids have been used as pain relievers for thousands of years,
and their addictiveness was known even to early users.36 This Part
provides a general history of opioid use and abuse in order to
provide a foundational perspective on today’s regulatory
environment surrounding opioids.
A.

Early History of Opioid Use Around the World

The first recorded uses of opium were found in ancient
Mesopotamia around the end of the third millennium B.C.37
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra Section II.C.2.
See infra Section II.C.3.
See infra Section II.C.4.
See infra Section II.C.5.
See infra Sections III.A–D.
See infra Section III.E.1.
See infra Section III.E.2.
See infra Part IV.
See The Birth of a Stereotype, NAT’L ALLIANCE ADVOCS. FOR BUPRENORPHINE
TREATMENT, https://www.naabt.org/education/birth_of_a_stereotype.cfm (last
visited May 18, 2017) (mentioning that early literature used the term “opium
sickness” to describe the addictiveness of the drug).
37. See Michael J. Brownstein, A Brief History of Opiates, Opioid Peptides, and Opioid
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However, it was not until the later part of the nineteenth century that
society began to notice high rates of addiction to the popular opium
derivative morphine.38 Since that time, healthcare providers have
struggled with balancing high rates of addiction to opioids with the
patient pain relief the drugs provide.39
Scholars have had difficulty determining when the opium
poppy was first cultivated because ancient authors were often
ambiguous regarding drug use and abuse; nonetheless, it is generally
thought that the Sumerians in ancient Mesopotamia (modern-day
Iraq) first cultivated the poppy toward the latter half of 3000 B.C.40
The Sumerians referred to the opium as “gil” or “joy” and called the
poppy “hul gil,” meaning “plant of joy.”41 Opium usage then spread
to the Assyrians and later to the Egyptians.42
Opium eventually spread to the Greeks.43 Sometime between
460 and 357 B.C., Hippocrates, the “father of modern medicine,”44
described the white, fire-red, and black poppy and acknowledged
each one’s usefulness in treating certain diseases.45 Around the same
time, Alexander the Great introduced opium to India when he and
his army took poppy with them to war.46

Receptors, 90 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5391, 5391 (1993),
http://www.pnas.org/content/90/12/5391.full.pdf.
38. Id.
39. See
generally
Opium
Throughout
History,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/heroin/etc/history.html (last
visited May 18, 2017) (providing a timeline on the history opium and its derivatives).
40. See Brownstein, supra note 37, at 5391.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See generally P.G. Kritikos & S.P. Papadaki, The History of the Poppy and of
Opium and Their Expansion in Antiquity in the Eastern Mediterranean Area, U.N. OFF. ON
DRUGS & CRIME BULL. ON NARCOTICS (Jan. 1, 1967), https://www.unodc.org/unodc
/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1967-01-01_3_page004.html#bf001
(presenting research regarding poppy and opium use amongst ancient Greeks).
44. Christos Yapijakis, Hippocrates of Kos, the Father of Clinical Medicine, and
Asclepiades of Bithynia, the Father of Molecular Medicine, 23 INT’L J. EXPERIMENTAL &
CLINICAL PATHOPHYSIOLOGY & DRUG RES. 507, 508 (2009) (arguing that Hippocrates
pioneered medicine based on rational conclusions instead of religious or magical
beliefs, which was the common practice at the time).
45. See id.
46. Id. It should be noted that Alexander the Great did not introduce the
poppy to India, but it is believed he introduced opium as a derivative from poppies.
See id.
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Around the fourth century A.D., opium had reached China
through Arab traders, but accounts of opium use there had been
noted even earlier.47 Sometime between 200 and 264 A.D., a
renowned Chinese surgeon, Hua To, is said to have had his patients
ingest opium before undergoing surgery.48
Little was written in Western literature about opioid usage
during the first two hundred years of the early modern era, roughly
between 1300 and 1799; however, towards the latter half of this
period, the modern opioid pill was created.49 Beginning around
1300, references to opium disappeared from the historical record,
most likely due to the Holy Inquisition happening in Europe at the
time: opium was from the “East,” and anything from the East was
thought to be linked to the devil.50
In 1527, Paracelsus, a Swiss-German alchemist and the founder
of toxicology, created opium pills and prescribed them as
painkillers.51 He derived a specific compound of opium that was
effective in reducing considerable amounts of pain and called this
element laudanum, a drug still available by prescription in the
United States today.52
Innovations in medicine dramatically increased opioid usage in
the nineteenth century. In 1806, German chemist Friedrich Wilhelm
Adam Sertürner isolated morphine from opium.53 After its
introduction into U.S. medicine, morphine became a “mainstay” in
chronic pain treatment and was used to treat all sorts of ailments.54
47. Opium—Poppy Cultivation, Morphine and Heroin Manufacture, THE VAULTS OF
EROWID, https://www.erowid.org/archive/rhodium/chemistry/opium.html (last
visited May 18, 2017).
48. Id.
49. Opium Throughout History, supra note 39; Purdue Pharma, A Brief History of
Opioids: Pain, Opioids and Medicinal Use, THE ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com
/sponsored/purdue-health/a-brief-history-of-opioids/184 (last visited May 18,
2017).
50. Opium Throughout History, supra note 39.
51. See id.; Purdue Pharma, supra note 49.
52. Purdue Pharma, supra note 49.
53. Brownstein, supra note 37, at 5391.
54. Renata Ferrari et. al., Risk Factors in Opioid Treatment of Chronic Non-Cancer
Pain: A Multidisciplinary Assessment, in PAIN MANAGEMENT: CURRENT ISSUES AND
OPINIONS 419, 420 (Gabor B. Racz & Carl E. Noe eds., 2012),
www.intechopen.com/books/pain-management-current-issues-and-opinions/risk
-factors-in-opioid-treatment-of-chronic-non-cancer-pain-a-multidisciplinary
-assessment (stating that opium was used to treat pain, anxiety, and respiratory
problems, as well as “consumption” and “women’s ailments”).
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By the 1850s, the invention of the hypodermic needle allowed for
opium to be used in minor surgical procedures.55 Physicians found
that injecting opium reduced the amount of chloroform needed for
surgical anesthesia.56 Morphine was also used on soldiers during the
U.S. Civil War, and morphine addiction became so common among
veterans that it became known as “soldier’s disease.”57
Morphine addiction alarmed physicians, so many years were
spent trying to find a safer, less addictive alternative.58 An alternative
was thought to be found in 1898, when scientists synthesized heroin,
a drug “more potent than morphine and free from abuse liability.”59
Clearly this was not true, however, as opioid addicts frequently abuse
heroin today.60
B.

Opioid Use and Regulation in Recent American History

Opium regulation began in the early twentieth century during
the Progressive Era.61 In 1909, Congress passed the Opium Exclusion
Act, barring opium imports for smoking purposes.62 This Act only
applied to opium used for smoking, a practice favored by the new
Chinese immigrants; it did not apply to medicinal uses of opium.63
In 1914, Congress imposed further regulations on opioids with
the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act.64 The original
55. Brownstein, supra note 37, at 5391.
56. Id. Claude Bernard first discovered this use of morphine by using it to
premedicate animals. Id.
57. See Amy Davidson, The “Soldier’s Disease,” THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-soldiers-disease.
58. Brownstein, supra note 37, at 5391.
59. Id.
60. As of 2015, approximately 591,000 Americans age twelve and older had a
substance abuse problem involving heroin. Opioid Addiction: 2016 Facts and Figures,
AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., http://www.asam.org/docs/default-source
/advocacy/opioid-addiction-disease-facts-figures.pdf (last visited May 18, 2017).
61. See A History of Opiate Laws in the United States, NAT’L ALLIANCE OF ADVOCS.
FOR BUPRENORPHINE TREATMENT, https://www.naabt.org/laws.cfm (last visited May
18, 2017) (explaining that the 1909 Smoking Opium Exclusion Act was the first time
the federal government banned the non-medical use of a substance).
62. Dale Gieringer, The Opium Exclusion Act of 1909, COUNTERPUNCH (Feb. 6,
2009),
http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/02/06/the-opium-exclusion-act-of
-1909/. Some believe the passage of this act was the unofficial beginning of the War
on Drugs. See id.
63. Id.
64. See David T. Courtwright, The Hidden Epidemic: Opiate Addiction and Cocaine
Use in the South, 1860–1920, 49 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 57, 57–58 (1983),
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interpretation of the Act only required physicians and pharmacists
to approve the distribution of opioids, but the Supreme Court
expanded the breadth of the statute.65 In Webb v. United States, the
Court ruled that under the Harrison Act, a physician could not
continually supply an addict solely to maintain that patient’s
addiction.66 In the aftermath of Webb, addicts were denied a legal
source of opioids, forcing many of them to turn to the black
market.67 In an effort to mitigate illegal drug purchases, local
municipalities established narcotics clinics, which supplied drugs—
and sometimes treatment—to addicts.68 However, the federal
government, relying on the Webb rule, forced many of these clinics
to close.69
While physicians were being blamed for creating morphine
dependence and manufacturers were pulling heroin-laced products
from the shelves, scientists were again attempting to create a nonaddictive pain-relieving alternative to opioids.70 The New York
Medical Journal described “morphinism [as] a disease, in the
majority of cases, initiated, sustained and left uncured by members
of the medical profession.”71 By 1916, due to its known harmful
effects and addiction, Bayer pharmaceuticals stopped using heroin
in cough suppressants.72 That same year, German scientists first
synthesized oxycodone, hoping that it would retain the same painrelieving effects as morphine and heroin but without the addiction.73
The 1920s and 1930s brought even more regulation of
prescription opioids and heroin.74 In 1924, Congress passed the
Heroin Act, effectively banning the importation, manufacture, and
possession of heroin.75 The Act also made medicinal heroin illegal

https://www.unf.edu/~dcourtwr/documents/The%20Hidden%20Epidemic.pdf.
65. See A History of Opiate Laws in the United States, supra note 61 (discussing the
Supreme Court rulings upholding the Harrison Act).
66. See 249 U.S. 96, 99–100 (1919).
67. See Courtwright, supra note 64, at 58.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Purdue Pharma, supra note 49.
71. Foster Kennedy, The Effects of Narcotic Drug Addiction, 100 N.Y. MED. J. 20, 20
(1914).
72. Purdue Pharma, supra note 49.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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for the first time.76 In 1938, Congress authorized one of the largest
regulations of drug monitoring in history by creating the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), to oversee the safety of drugs before they
were sold.77 The FDA did not outlaw the use of opioids already sold—
codeine, morphine, and oxycodone—so physicians could still
prescribe these drugs to patients.78
During the 1950s and 1960s, there were large increases in the
usage of both prescription opioids and heroin.79 In 1950, access to
oxycodone expanded when the FDA approved Percodan, a mix of
the opioid oxycodone with aspirin.80 With the wide availability of
oxycodone came widespread dependence on the drug, which is still
a problem today.81 In the 1960s, there was a resurgence in illegal
heroin smuggling into the country, which was attributed to the
ongoing Vietnam War.82 Finally, in 1969, the World Health
Organization stated that medicinal morphine does not necessarily
lead to dependence and for the first time distinguished between
tolerance and physical dependence on the one hand and drug
dependence on the other.83
In 1970, Congress responded to increased opioid and drug use
with the passage of the Controlled Substances Act, which placed all
prescription narcotics and opioids into five so-called schedules.84
The opioids placed in Schedule I were considered the most
dangerous and were no longer allowed to be prescribed.85 By the
mid-1970s, President Nixon had created the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) and officially declared the War on Drugs.86

76. Id.
77. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
See generally Katharine A. Van Tassel, Slaying the Hydra: The History of Quack Medicine,
the Obesity Epidemic, and the FDA’s Battle to Regulate Dietary Supplements Marketed as
Weight Loss Aids, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 203, 223–25 (2009) (providing a general
overview of the passage of the FDCA, which gave rise to the FDA).
78. Purdue Pharma, supra note 49.
79. See id.; Opium Throughout History, supra note 39.
80. See Purdue Pharma, supra note 49.
81. See id.
82. See Opium Throughout History, supra note 39.
83. Purdue Pharma, supra note 49.
84. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2012).
85. See id. § 812(b)(1).
86. See Letter from President Richard Nixon to Congress (June 17, 1971),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048.
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A phenomenon occurred in clinics and hospitals across the
country during the 1980s that had a huge effect on the standard of
care for treating patient pain in the following decades.87 This
phenomenon was called “opiophobia,” which meant a physician’s
fear to prescribe opioids—even in cases of terminal illness.88 There
have been many theories about what led to the rise of opiophobia,
ranging from unfounded fears (that any opioid prescription would
cause addiction) to blatant racism (where many physicians refused
to prescribe opioids to African Americans because of the racist belief
that African Americans were more likely to become drug addicts).89
Despite the rise of opiophobia, however, some physicians did begin
to use prescription opioids to treat pain unrelated to terminal illness,
a practice that many believe contributed to the opioid abuse
epidemic today.90
A consequence of opiophobia from the 1980s was an epidemic
of pain undertreatment in the 1990s.91 Throughout the decade,
many clinicians and organizations lobbied federal and state
legislators to allow increased use of opioids to treat all pain, not just
pain associated with terminal illness.92
While physicians and pain societies were busy lobbying
Congress, opioid manufacturers were researching more efficient
ways to manage pain.93 Scientists invented extended-release opioids,
which were more effective in managing pain because the pill’s
soothing effects were slowly released over time rather than all at

87. See Timothy J. Atkinson et al., The Damage Done by the War on Opioids: The
Pendulum Has Swung Too Far, 201 J. PAIN RES. 265, 265 (2014) (describing how “the
American pain medicine landscape was characterized by opiophobia, the fear to
prescribe opioids”).
88. Id.
89. See Annemarie Daly Linares, Opioid Pseudoaddiction: A Casualty of the War on
Drugs, Racism, Sexism, and Opiophobia, 15 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 89, 104–06 (2012).
90. See generally Sujata S. Jayawant & Rajesh Balkrishnan, The Controversy
Surrounding OxyContin Abuse: Issues and Solutions, 1 THERAPEUTICS & CLINICAL RISK
MGMT. 77 (2005) (discussing how OxyContin has been used to treat severe pain, not
just pain associated with terminal cancers).
91. See Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for
Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 1, 2 (2000) (describing how healthcare
scholarship has documented a serious and persistent problem—the
undertreatment of pain and the failure to effectively address suffering in the clinical
setting).
92. See Atkinson et al., supra note 87, at 265.
93. See Purdue Pharma, supra note 49.
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once, as was done in the past.94 Marketers took advantage of both
this new technology and increased consumer demand and began to
heavily advertise the use of extended-release prescription opioids.95
By 1999, around 2.6 million Americans age twelve and older were
misusing prescription pain relievers.96
In the first decade of the new millennium, both healthcare
leaders and legal scholars began to push for pain management to be
heavily considered in a physician’s applicable standard of care.97
During this time, TJC began to incorporate these new standards of
care, calling pain the “fifth vital sign.”98
Concurrently, prescription opioid abuse continued to increase,
with the rates of abuse doubling between 1998 and 2008.99 By the
mid-2000s, pharmaceutical companies were researching ways to
make opioids harder to abuse, but none of the new formulas
prevented oral abuse.100 The FDA also implemented educational
programs warning providers about opioid abuse.101
C.

Opioid Abuse Today
1.

The Modern Opioid Epidemic

The United States suffers from an opioid abuse epidemic
unseen in previous decades. In 2014, 21.5 million Americans age
twelve or older had a substance abuse disorder.102 Of that 21.5
million, 1.9 million were addicted to prescription pain relievers, and
586,000 were addicted to heroin.103

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Prescription Drug Abuse Statistics, BAYSIDE MARIN (Nov. 19, 2016),
http://www.baysidemarin.com/prescription-drugs/abuse-statistics/.
97. See Rich, supra note 91, at 2–3.
98. Atkinson et al., supra note 87, at 265.
99. Purdue Pharma, supra note 49; see Rudd et al., supra note 20, at 1378
(discussing the overall increase of opioid drug abuse, specifically focusing on
overdose deaths in the United States since 2000).
100. Purdue Pharma, supra note 49.
101. Id.
102. SARRA L. HEDDEN ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2014
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 2 (2015), https://www.samhsa.gov
/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FRR1-2014/NSDUH-FRR1-2014.pdf.
103. Id. at 22, 27.
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Opioid overdose death rates have continued to rise.104 In 2014,
more people died of lethal drug overdoses than in any year on
record, totaling 47,055.105 Of those 47,055 lethal drug overdoses,
which was more than one-and-a-half times the number of deaths
from motor vehicle crashes in the country,106 18,893 (or 40% of the
total) were from prescription painkillers, and 10,574 (22%) were
from heroin.107 This is a sharp rise from 1999, when there were
16,849 lethal drug overdoses in the United States, with only 4030
(24%) related to prescription painkillers and 1960 (12%) related to
heroin.108 In every year from 1999 to 2014, with the exception of
2012, the number of deaths from prescription painkillers has
increased.109
The sale of prescription opioids across the United States has also
steadily risen since 1999.110 In 2011, there were 7,200,000 milligrams
of prescription opioids sold across the country, compared with
1,800,000 milligrams sold in 1999.111 Minnesota’s opioid abuse
pattern mirrors the national abuse trend.112 From 1999 to 2014, the
number of opioid overdoses across the state rose more than 500%,
with 319 deaths in 2014, compared to sixty in 1999.113 As with the
national trend, prescription painkillers have been the leading cause
of opioid-related deaths from 1999 to 2014, with 1767 deaths,
compared to 1495 deaths from non-prescription opioids.114 Both
national and state trends show opioid abuse is growing, and there is
little to no sign of these trends slowing down.
2.

The TJC Pain Management Standard

The TJC Pain Management Standard, which was introduced in
2001 and encouraged hospitals to create pain assessment policies
104.
105.
106.
107.

Rudd et al., supra note 20, at 1378.
Id.
Id.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NUMBER AND AGE-ADJUSTED RATES OF DRUGPOISONING DEATHS INVOLVING OPIOID ANALGESICS AND HEROIN: UNITED STATES, 1999–
2014,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/health_policy/AADR_drug_poisoning
_involving_OA_Heroin_US_2000-2014.pdf (last visited May 18, 2017).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Collins, supra note 19.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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and procedures,115 could be a reason why physicians are
overprescribing opioids.116 The standard may encourage “physicians,
dentists, and nurse practitioners—rather than drug cartels and street
dealers—[to] play prominent roles in escalating drug use.”117 The
standard discusses how pain management is an important part of
patient-centered care and requires that certain healthcare providers
implement strategies to help the patient fight pain.118 In July 2015,
TJC clarified the two different strategies that providers should use to
alleviate pain: pharmacologic and nonpharmacologic.119 The
standard clarifies that the strategies are not exhaustive and that
providers and patients should work together in implementing an
efficient pain management strategy; it also clarifies that the provider
should discuss the risks and benefits of each option with the patient,
including the risk of addiction and abuse.120
TJC likely clarified its 2001 Pain Management Standard in July
2015 because of the negative attention TJC received regarding its
perceived role in the opioid abuse epidemic.121 Since TJC released
this clarification only recently, it may be too early to see if it will have
any effect in curbing the number of opioid prescriptions and
frequency of abuse.
115. JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., JOINT COMMISSION
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS PAIN STANDARDS FOR 2001,
https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/2001_Pain_Standards.pdf (last visit
Apr. 27, 2017) (outlining how healthcare organizations should assess and treat
pain).
116. See Nathan Trexler, Developments in Delaware Health Law: Addressing
Prescription Drug Abuse, 14 DEL. L. REV. 29, 29 n.4 (2013).
117. Jeanmarie Perrone & Lewis S. Nelson, Medication Reconciliation for Controlled
Substances—An “Ideal” Prescription-Drug Monitoring Program, 366 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2341, 2341 (2012).
118. The Joint Comm’n, Clarification of the Pain Management Standard, 34 JOINT
COMMISSION PERSP. 11, 11 (2014) [hereinafter TJC 2015 Pain Management Standard].
This pain management standard applies to “Ambulatory Care, Critical Access
Hospital[s], Home Care, Hospital[s], Nursing Care Centers, and Office-Based
Surgery Practice Programs.” Id.
119. Id. Nonpharmacologic strategies include “physical modalities (for
example, acupuncture therapy, chiropractic therapy, osteopathic manipulative
treatment, massage therapy, and physical therapy), relaxation therapy, and
cognitive behavioral therapy.” Id. Pharmacologic strategies include “nonopioid,
opioid, and adjuvant analgesics.” Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. Medical scholars believe that TJC’s pain management standards have
led to the “liberalization” of physicians prescribing opioids. Trexler, supra note 116,
at 29 n.4 (quoting Perrone & Nelson, supra note 117, at 2341).
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New CDC Guidelines

In the face of the mounting crisis, the CDC recently expanded
its efforts to combat opioid addiction. In March 2016, the agency
published new guidelines for prescribing opioids to patients with
chronic pain outside of cancer treatment, palliative care, and endof-life treatment.122 The CDC arrived at these recommendations
after reviewing scientific data about “the effectiveness, benefits, and
harms of long-term opioid therapy for chronic pain”123 and grouped
the recommendations into three categories: “determining when to
initiate or continue opioids for chronic pain[;] [o]pioid selection,
dosage, duration, follow-up, and discontinuation[;] [and]
[a]ssessing risk and addressing harms of opioid use.”124
The first group of CDC recommendations revolves around
when to initiate or continue opioid therapy.125 The CDC essentially
gives two recommendations: first, physicians should prioritize
nonopioid therapy; and second, physicians should continually
discuss the realistic goals and benefits—as well as the risks—of opioid
therapy with the patient.126 These recommendations complement
TJC’s clarifications that its standards do not require opioid therapy
for pain management and that opioids should only be prescribed
when appropriate.127 Together, the CDC recommendations and TJC
clarifications emphasize to physicians that opioid therapies are not
ideal and should be avoided when possible, thus potentially helping
to curb opioid abuse.
The next four recommendations concern “[o]pioid selection,
dosage, duration, follow-up, and discontinuation.”128 Many of the
122. See Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic
Pain—United States, 2016, 65 MORBIDITY & MORALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (2016).
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 15.
125. Id. at 16. There are three recommendations for initiating or continuing
opioid therapy: (1) nonopioid therapy is preferred; (2) physicians should establish
realistic treatment goals with patients; and (3) the physician should continually
discuss with the patient the risks and benefits of opioid therapy. Id.
126. See id.
127. See David W. Baker, Joint Commission Statement on Pain Management, THE
JOINT COMMISSION (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.jointcommission.org/joint
_commission_statement_on_pain_management/.
128. Dowell et al., supra note 122, at 15. The four recommendations state that
(1) physicians should prescribe immediate-release opioids; (2) patients should be
prescribed the lowest effective dose and be carefully evaluated when increasing the
dose; (3) patients should only be prescribed opioids for the number of days they
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recommendations in this category reflect common sense, such as
physicians only prescribing the lowest effective dose and only
prescribing opioids for the number of days needed.129 Recently,
states such as Louisiana have passed legislation to limit the number
of days physicians can prescribe opioids in accord with the CDC
recommendations.130 As of today, nine states have codified similar
limitations, but some still allow pharmacists to prescribe for thirtyday periods, which is far beyond the maximum recommended by the
CDC.131
The final five recommendations involve assessing the risks and
addressing the harms of opioid abuse.132 The CDC encourages
constant monitoring of the patient undergoing opioid therapy,
which again parallels TJC’s recent clarifications requiring the
provider to assess and reassess the patient’s pain during opioid

will need them, usually three days or less and seven days in rare circumstances; and
(4) physicians should evaluate patients throughout the opioid therapy, and if risks
of continued opioid therapy outweigh the benefits, physicians should prioritize
nonopioid therapies, taper patients to a lower dosage of opioids, or “taper and
discontinue opioids.” Id. at 16.
129. Id.
130. H.R. 192, 2017 Leg., 43d Sess. (La. 2017). See generally Elizabeth Crisp,
Legislature Advances Bill to Limit Opioid Prescriptions, Others to Address Opioid “Epidemic,”
THE ADVOC. (Apr. 26, 2017, 6:27 PM), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge
/news/politics/legislature/article_e0407f38-2a96-11e7-b669-a3bbcfc86159.html
(discussing opioid legislation in Louisiana).
131. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14o(b) (West, Westlaw through
2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2600-C (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.
of the 128th Legis.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 19D (West, Westlaw through
2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-15.2(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017); N.Y. PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW § 3331 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2017); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 873.3 (West, Westlaw through 2017); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 21-283.18(l) (West, Westlaw through 2017); 24 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 9.0 (2016); 13-14-076
VT. CODE R. § 8.1.9 (2017).
132. Dowell et al., supra note 122, at 16. The five recommendations suggest that
(1) physicians evaluate patients’ risk factors for opioid abuse; (2) physicians review
state Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs continually to ensure patients are not
abusing opioids; (3) physicians conduct urine drug testing throughout opioid
therapy; (4) physicians avoid prescribing opioids and benzodiazepines
concurrently, as they depress the central nervous system and increase the
respiratory drive, placing a patient at a greater risk for overdose; and (5) if a
physician concludes a patient has an opioid abuse disorder, the physician should
provide the patient with a combination of medication-assisted treatment and
behavioral therapy. Id. (citing id. at 32 and discussing the harms of prescribing
opioids and benzodiazepines concurrently).
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treatment.133 This group of CDC recommendations presumes that if
a physician consistently monitors a patient throughout opioid
therapy, that physician will be able to spot red flags before additional
problems develop and can provide the patient the help he or she
needs.
The CDC makes clear that these guidelines are just one step in
combating opioid addiction and that physicians must make an effort
to comply with these guidelines in order to see effective results.134
The guidelines will be revisited when new evidence regarding their
effectiveness comes to light.135
4.

The Effect of the ACA

The ACA includes a patient satisfaction requirement, which has
also incentivized physicians to overprescribe opioids.136 In October
2012, a portion of the ACA was revised to require hospitals to report
data from patient satisfaction surveys.137 The model survey was
developed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.138 The survey
allows patients to rate the hospital on nine key topics, notably
including pain management: “communication with doctors,
communication with nurses, responsiveness of hospital staff, pain
management, communication about medicines, discharge
information, cleanliness of the hospital environment, quietness of
the hospital environment, and transition of care.”139 Thirty percent
of the hospital’s overall quality rating depends on the patient

133. See Baker, supra note 127.
134. Dowell et al., supra note 122, at 33.
135. Id. at 35.
136. See Alyse Fischer, Tough Love: Why Patients Should Change Physician
Expectations, 25 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 97, 103–04 (2015)
(“[P]hysicians admit they have changed their course of practice due to these new
provisions under the ACA. One disturbing example of this change is doctors who
prescribe stronger drugs than a patient needs just to increase patient satisfaction
scores.”).
137. Id. at 101.
138. Id.
139. HOSP. CONSUMER ASSESSMENT OF HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS AND SYS.: CAHPS
HOSP. SURVEY, http://www.hcahpsonline.org/ (last visited May 18, 2017). The
survey also includes questions about demographic information and patient
perspectives on care. Id. These other topics do not have an impact on the opioid
abuse epidemic. Id.
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satisfaction survey responses, and a low rating could impact the
hospital’s Medicare funding.140
In an effort to enforce the new ACA provision, the federal
government withheld $850 million from hospitals upon
implementation, an amount expected to double in 2017.141 To earn
this money back, hospitals must report high patient satisfaction
scores.142 This implementation measure has placed ACA-bound
hospitals at risk of losing anywhere between $500,000 and $850,000
annually.143 As of 2017, all physicians who accept Medicare patients
will see their pay linked to responses from these patient satisfaction
surveys.144
Recent studies have concluded that tying Medicare funding to
patient satisfaction surveys has negatively impacted healthcare and
contributed to the opioid abuse epidemic.145 With the new ACA
provisions, physicians subscribe to the belief that “[m]ore tests and
stronger drugs equal more satisfied patients, and more satisfied
patients equal more pay.”146 Now, some hospitals overtreat patients
by taking measures such as providing prescription medications to all
patients discharged from the hospital.147 Providing prescription
medications in this manner is dangerous practice because the
chemical composition of prescription opioids provides pleasurable
pain relief, eventually causing individuals to reward themselves
through substance abuse.148
140. Fischer, supra note 136, at 101.
141. Id. at 102.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 104–06; see also Joshua J. Fenton et al., The Cost of Satisfaction: A
National Study of Patient Satisfaction, Health Care Utilization, Expenditures, and Mortality,
172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 405, 409 (2012) (finding that higher patient
satisfaction correlated with overall increases in healthcare costs, prescription drugs,
and increased mortality); William Sonnenberg, Patient Satisfaction Is Overrated, 46
KEYSTONE PHYSICIAN 4, 4 (2013), http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/pafp
/keystonephysician_2013fall/index.php?startid=4#/4 (describing how a physician
at a medical conference told an audience that he increased his patient satisfaction
score by 7% by prescribing an antibiotic to all patients who complained of a cough,
sore throat, or sinus headache).
146. Kai Falkenberg, Why Rating Your Doctor Is Bad for Your Health, FORBES (Jan.
2, 2013, 9:06 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kaifalkenberg/2013/01/02/why
-rating-your-doctor-is-bad-for-your-health/.
147. Fischer, supra note 136, at 104.
148. Opioid Addiction 2016 Facts & Figures, AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED. (2016),
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Current Combative Measures

In recent years, federal and state governments have begun to
step up their efforts in combating the opioid abuse epidemic. In May
2015, Nora Volkow, the director of the National Institute on Drug
Abuse, gave a speech to Congress outlining specific steps the federal
government is taking to combat opioid abuse.149 She noted the
efficiency of several types of interventions, in particular,
Educational initiatives delivered in school and community
settings (primary prevention); [s]upporting consistent use
of prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs);
[i]mplementation of overdose education and naloxone
distribution programs to issue naloxone directly to opioid
users and potential bystanders; [a]ggressive law
enforcement efforts to address doctor shopping and pill
mills; [d]iverting individuals with substance use disorders
to Drug Courts; [e]xpansion of access to [medicationassisted treatment]; [and] [a]buse-deterrent formulations
for opioid analgesics.150
This section will analyze four of these approaches: prescription
drug monitoring programs,151 increased naloxone distribution
programs,152 law enforcement efforts to limit doctor shopping and
pill mills,153 and increased access to drug courts.154
a.

PDMPs

In recent years, most states have enacted prescription drug
monitoring programs (PDMPs) to help curb prescription opioid
substance abuse.155 PDMPs allow the government to monitor
http://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/opioid-addiction-disease
-facts-figures.pdf.
149. Volkow, supra note 25.
150. Id.
151. See infra Section II.C.5.a.
152. See infra Section II.C.5.b.
153. See infra Section II.C.5.c.
154. See infra Section II.C.5.d.
155. See KAREN BLUMENSCHEIN ET AL., REVIEW OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING
PROGRAMS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
1,
4
(2010),
http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/85989824-1030-4AA6-91E1-7F9E3EF68827
/0/KASPEREvaluationPDMPStatusFinalReport6242010.pdf (demonstrating that
by June 1, 2010, forty-two states had enacted legislation providing for the formation
of PDMPs, and thirty-three states had created functioning PDMPs). See generally
Volkow, supra note 25 (discussing the effectiveness of PDMPs in Florida and
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electronic prescription data submitted by healthcare prescribers;
state governments typically provide physicians and pharmacists
access to this data so the practitioners know what medications
patients under their care have been prescribed.156 In her speech
before Congress, Nora Volkow particularly focused on Washington
and Florida as examples of effective PDMPs, noting that Washington
saw dramatic decreases in opioid deaths between 2008 and 2012 and
Florida saw the same between 2010 and 2012.157
b.

Increased Naloxone Distribution Programs

Naloxone is an opioid-reversal drug that restores normal
respiration to a person who has overdosed on prescription opioids
or heroin.158 Traditionally, naloxone has only been available as an
injection and only carried by medical emergency personnel.159
Recently, the FDA authorized an auto-injector of naloxone that can
be distributed by caregivers who witness a drug overdose.160 As of
2014, thirty states and Washington, D.C., have implemented takehome naloxone programs, which have reversed 26,463 drug
overdoses.161
c.

Efforts to Reduce Doctor Shopping and Pill Mills

Doctor shopping and pill mills have also contributed to the
current prescription drug crisis.162 Traditionally, pill mills were “a
network of medical doctors and pharmacists who [would] prescribe
Washington state). The PDMP assistance website has profiles on all states describing
their action or inaction on PDMPs. See State Profiles, PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING
PROGRAM
TRAINING
&
TECH.
ASSISTANCE
CTR.,
http://www.pdmpassist.org/content/state-profiles (last visited May 18, 2017).
Missouri is the only state that does not have legislation enacting a PDMP. See id.
156. Prescription Drug Monitoring Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), PRESCRIPTION
DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR.,
http://www.pdmpassist.org/content/prescription-drug-monitoring-frequently
-asked-questions-faq (last visited May 18, 2017).
157. Volkow, supra note 25.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Eliza Wheeler et al., Opioid Overdose Prevention Programs Providing Naloxone
to Laypersons—United States, 2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 631, 631,
633 (2015).
162. See Khary K. Rigg et al., Prescription Drug Abuse and Diversion: Role of the Pain
Clinic, 40 J. DRUG ISSUES 1, 2 (2010).
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and fill controlled substance prescriptions to drug seeking
individuals.”163 Today, pill mills are a network of physicians who
prescribe opioids to drug-seeking patients, who then “cash in” the
prescription at a pharmacy.164
Several states have attempted to regulate doctor shopping and
pill mills. For instance, Texas passed legislation to allow the state
medical licensing board to monitor pain management clinics in an
effort to curb the overprescribing of opioids.165 Some scholars have
lauded Texas for its efforts but have noted that the legislation did
not go far enough in countering opioid substance abuse.166 In
contrast, Florida’s partnership with the federal DEA in raiding pill
mills helped the state to witness a dramatic decrease in overdose
deaths between 2010 and 2012.167
d.

Focus on Drug Courts

Recently, states have shifted their focus in the War on Drugs
from a statutory and law-enforcement response to a public-health
response, focusing on drug addiction and drug-related crime.168
Many believe that a new focus on drug courts will be more successful
than past efforts at combating drug addiction since “drug
courts have incorporated successful public health strategies into the
criminal law to achieve better outcomes, such as reduced recidivism,
cost-effectiveness, and the optimization of public safety.”169
III. NEXT STEPS: REPEAL, REVISE, AND IMPLEMENT
Despite a plethora of legislation, regulations, and
recommendations, the rate of opioid deaths continues to rise each
year.170 Clearly something else needs to occur in order to decrease
163. Casturi, supra note 6, at 447.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 454–56.
166. See id. at 466.
167. See Volkow, supra note 25 (citing Hal Johnson et al., Decline in Drug Overdose
Deaths After State Policy Change—Florida, 2010–2012, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. NO. 26 557, 569–74 (2014)).
168. See, e.g., Stephen Hunter et al., New Jersey’s Drug Courts: A Fundamental Shift
from the War on Drugs to a Public Health Approach for Drug Addiction and Drug-Related
Crime, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 795, 796 (2012).
169. Id.
170. See Rudd et al., supra note 20, at 1378 (stating that between 2000 and 2014,
the number of opioid overdose deaths increased by 200%).
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the occurrence of stories similar to those of Dan Baker and Prince.
There is essentially a two-step process in effectuating significant
change in the current opioid abuse epidemic. First, there must be a
repeal of the patient satisfaction survey requirement in the ACA and
either a repeal or revision of TJC’s Pain Management Standard.171
Second, there must be effective federal and state implementation of
the programs discussed in Volkow’s speech before Congress.172
A.

Repeal of Patient Satisfaction Surveys in the ACA173

As previously discussed, the ACA has a provision aimed at
incentivizing hospitals to provide better care for their patients.174 A
portion of the ACA survey allows patients to rate the hospital on its
pain management, which then contributes to the hospital’s total
score.175 If the hospital receives a low score, it could lose a portion of
its Medicare reimbursement from the federal government.176
Essentially, this incentivizes hospitals to prescribe more pain
medicine to prevent low scores due to patient discomfort.177
In addition to incentivizing more opioid prescriptions, this ACA
provision does not accurately capture the quality of patient care.178
A national study found that higher patient satisfaction might not
mean greater outcomes.179 From 2000 to 2007, over 50,000 adults
were studied, observing each individual during a two-year cycle.180
Each survey asked the participants questions about their patient
satisfaction and health care expenditures, and the study later
analyzed the death rates of the participants.181 The results showed
171. See infra Sections III.A–D.
172. See infra Section III.E.
173. This section is based on the ACA as of April 2017. Since Republicans now
have a majority in both houses of Congress and the presidency, there is a chance
this law could be repealed, making the arguments in this section moot. See Alison
Kodjak, Trump Can Kill Obamacare with or Without Help from Congress, NPR (Nov. 9,
2016,
7:05
AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/11/09
/501203831/trump-can-kill-obamacare-with-or-without-help-from-congress.
174. See Fischer, supra note 136, at 101–03.
175. Id. at 101–02.
176. Id. at 102.
177. See id. at 103–04.
178. See id. at 103 (“These disturbing findings indicate that patient satisfaction
is not a reliable indicator of quality healthcare.”).
179. See Fenton et al., supra note 145, at 409.
180. Id. at 406–07.
181. Id. at 406.
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that individuals with higher patient satisfaction scores had greater
odds of hospital admission, greater costs on health care and drugs,
and a higher mortality rate.182 This demonstrates that patient
satisfaction might not be the best indicator of quality healthcare.183
Some physicians have even resorted to unprofessional and
unsafe practices in order to achieve adequate patient satisfaction
scores.184 In another study, researchers investigated whether patient
satisfaction surveys had a negative impact on physician practices and
patient care.185 The study showed that these surveys can promote
inappropriate clinical care, among other dissatisfying outcomes.186
The analysis included the following selected quotes from study
participants indicating how these surveys can promote inappropriate
medical practices:
Narcotic seekers are another huge problem and they are
well aware of the patient satisfaction scores and how they
can use these threats and complaints to obtain narcotics.
I give a few pain pills to seekers who I would previously have
said no.
[W]e practice bad medicine as a result of [the patient
satisfaction] surveys.
Narcotic abuse is the biggest problem because the drug
seeker knows the game and threatens to call administration
more than any other group.187
A common theme of the results of these studies seems to be that the
surveys allow some narcotic users to game the system to gain the
drugs they seek.
Patient satisfaction surveys have had little effect in efficiently
monitoring hospitals.188 They have been mediocre at best at
improving hospital practices, and even studies that report
improvements have had contradictory findings.189 In fact, it seems
182. Id. at 405.
183. Fischer, supra note 136, at 103.
184. Id. at 103–04.
185. See Aleksandra Zgierska et al., Impact of Patient Satisfaction Ratings on
Physicians and Clinical Care, 8 PATIENT PREFERENCE & ADHERENCE 437 (2014).
186. Id. at 443. The results also suggested that the surveys can result in job
dissatisfaction and attrition, but both are outside the scope of this article. Id.
187. Id. at 440.
188. See Fischer, supra note 136, at 106; Rashid Al-Abri & Amina Al-Balushi,
Patient Satisfaction Survey as a Tool Towards Quality Improvement, 29 OMAN MED. J. 3, 5
(2014).
189. Cf. Al-Abri & Al-Balushi, supra note 188, at 5 (“[T]here is little published
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that patient satisfaction surveys have only led to increased costs for
both patients and health care providers.190 For example, in order to
regain their Medicare incentive funding, hospitals have been forced
to spend money on “frivolous amenities such as flat screen
televisions, live music, valet parking, and custom-order room-service
meals.”191 Hospitals have also spent time and money training nurses
in bedside manner, even providing them with scripts to rehearse
their lines with patients.192 In short, research has shown that the
ACA’s patient satisfaction surveys do little to improve the overall
quality of care and mainly have the effect of incentivizing hospitals
to prescribe more opioids and spend more on frivolous amenities in
an effort to improve a very important, yet mostly meaningless score.
B.

Repeal of TJC’s Pain Management Standards

TJC’s pain management standards have a large influence on
hospitals throughout the country, in part because many states use
the standards to establish a baseline for their own standards of care
in medical malpractice actions.193 In 2001, TJC unveiled new
standards for pain management, which were highly exalted by
medical scholars at the time.194 These seven new standards indicated
research on improvements resulting from feedback information of patient
surveys.”). An article in The Atlantic states that if hospitals want to provide their
patients with better care, they should focus on hiring nurses “rather than tricking
patients into believing they’re getting better care.” Alexandra Robbins, The Problem
with Satisfied Patients, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com
/health/archive/2015/04/the-problem-with-satisfied-patients/390684/.
190. Fischer, supra note 136, at 106.
191. Id. at 107.
192. Id. In a physician blog that provided different ways to improve patient
satisfaction scores, the first option was to “[h]ire sunshine,” meaning happy people.
Lucien W. Robert, Six Ways to Improve Patient Satisfaction Scores, PHYSICIAN’S PRAC.
(May 20, 2015), http://www.physicianspractice.com/physician-compensation/six
-ways-improve-patient-satisfaction-scores. Of course this means that Grey’s Anatomy
star character Dr. Cristina Yang, a highly qualified yet notoriously difficult heart
surgeon, might not have been hired by Seattle Grace Hospital, since she could
possibly cause the hospital to lose its Medicare reimbursement. See Grey’s Anatomy
(ABC television broadcast Mar. 27, 2005).
193. See Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses,
29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 39 (2001).
194. See id. (“[TJC] standards finally addressed pain management in hospitals
and the need for proper organizational structures to promote such management.”);
Laura D. Seng, Legal and Regulatory Barriers to Adequate Pain Control for Elders in LongTerm Care Facilities, 6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 108 (2003) (arguing that TJC standards
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that pain management should be a top priority for physicians.195
After the adoption of these standards, there was an astronomical
increase in the number of opioid prescriptions.196 This, in turn, led
to a large rise in opioid addiction.197
In 2015, TJC clarified the 2001 standards, stating that both
pharmacologic and nonpharmacologic therapies should be used in
managing pain.198 In April 2016, David Baker, an Executive Vice
President of TJC, released a statement discussing the 2015
clarifications, which clearly stated that the 2001 standards had been
misconstrued and TJC was not responsible for today’s opioid abuse
epidemic.199
C.

The Effect of TJC’s Pain Management Standards on the Standard of
Care in Medical Malpractice Actions

This section argues that TJC’s standards did indeed have a
major influence on today’s opioid abuse epidemic. Specifically,
TJC’s pain management standards, even with the 2015 clarifications,
can help a patient establish an advantageous duty of care for a claim
against a physician for underprescribing opioids. To avoid this, TJC
should limit the application of its standards exclusively to terminallyencourage better pain assessment protocols).
195. TJC’s 2001 pain management standards included:
1. the right of patients to appropriate assessment and management of
pain;
2. assessing the nature and intensity of pain in all patients;
3. recording the results in a way that allows regular reassessment and
follow up;
4. determining and assuring staff competency in pain assessment and
management, including in the orientation of all new staff;
5. establishing policies and procedures to support appropriate
prescription or ordering of effective pain medications;
6. educating patients and families about effective pain management; and
7. addressing patient needs for symptom management in the discharge
planning process.
Furrow, supra note 193, at 39 n.160.
196. See Collins, supra note 19.
197. See Prescribing Data, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing.html (last visited May 18,
2017).
198. TJC 2015 Pain Management Standard, supra note 118, at 11 (discussing the
clarifications to TJC’s pain management standards that went into effect January 1,
2015).
199. Baker, supra note 127.
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ill patients. This limitation better complies with the original intent
of the standards, which was to combat opiophobia and stop the
needless suffering of terminal patients.
Traditionally, in order to bring a successful medical malpractice
claim the patient must establish four elements: (1) the defendant
doctor owed a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty of
care; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual damage; and (4) the
defendant’s breach actually caused the plaintiff’s damages.200
Typically, the physician owes the patient a duty of care when they are
in a treatment relationship; the standard is what a reasonable
physician would do under the same or similar circumstances.201
Further, courts have clarified that reasonableness is measured by the
“degree of knowledge and skill which is ordinarily possessed and
exercised by other members of [the] profession in similar
circumstances.”202 TJC’s pain management standards could affect
the way that this knowledge is measured.
A physician’s expected knowledge is usually measured by
clinical practice guidelines.203 State or federal statutes do not set
these guidelines; rather, these guidelines are the product of
thoughts and literature within the medical profession, and such
thoughts become a standard practice when they are generally
accepted.204 TJC’s pain management standards have become
generally accepted because hospitals are required to abide by them
in order to be accredited.205 Therefore, these standards can be used
as evidence to determine if a physician was negligent regarding a
patient’s pain management.206 It seems logical to conclude that,

200. See, e.g., Paul v. Skemp, 625 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Wis. 2001). Each of the four
elements has additional sub-elements; however, for the purposes of this article, only
the duty element will be discussed in detail.
201. See, e.g., Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr., Inc., 684 N.W.2d 864, 871
(Mich. 2004) (holding that a professional relationship between a doctor and patient
is a prerequisite to a medical malpractice action); Palmer v. Biloxi Reg. Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346, 1354 (Miss. 1990) (stating that the nationally recognized
standard of care for physicians is that which is reasonable and ordinary).
202. E.g., Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 392–93 (Cal. 1976).
203. Furrow, supra note 193, at 31.
204. Id. at 31–32.
205. See id. at 39.
206. Since TJC’s standards have codified effective pain management as an
integral part of a hospital’s accreditation process, a hospital could be liable under a
theory of corporate negligence, which extends liability of a hospital to the negligent
acts of its employees. See id. at 38–39.
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based solely on the 2001 standard, a plaintiff could easily prove that
a physician acted unreasonably in failing to prescribe opioids to
properly manage pain.
It is doubtful that the 2015 clarifications would negatively
impact a patient’s malpractice suit against a physician or hospital for
undertreating pain. The clarification simply states that
pharmacologic and nonpharmacologic approaches may be used in
the treatment of chronic pain, but it does not state that
nonpharmacologic approaches are ideal or mandatory.207
Therefore, even with the new clarifications, physicians are still highly
incentivized to overprescribe opioids to avoid medical malpractice
actions. In order to curb overprescription, TJC should limit the
reach of its pain management standard to terminally ill patients, who
coincidentally were the original subjects behind the legislative push
to allow physicians to more liberally prescribe opioids.
D.

Reasoning Behind TJC’s Pain Management Standard and the
Recommended Evolution of That Standard

TJC’s 2001 Pain Management Standard was part of a larger
effort by pain lobbyists in the 1990s to decrease fears related to
opiophobia.208 During this time physicians were fearful of
prescribing opioids to any patient, even those who were terminally
ill, out of fear that the patient would become addicted.209 In response
to this growing concern, TJC unveiled the standards to establish a
duty for accredited hospitals to adequately treat and manage patient
pain.210
207. See TJC 2015 Pain Management Standard, supra note 118, at 11. Of course, as
mentioned earlier, the CDC guidelines released in March 2016 state that
nonpharmacologic approaches should be prioritized over pharmacologic
approaches. See Dowell et al., supra note 122, at 16. As of this writing, there has not
been litigation providing an opportunity for a court to decide which guidelines
would establish the proper standard of care.
208. See Daniel S. Goldberg & Ben Rich, Pharmacovigilence [sic] and the Plight of
Chronic Pain Patients: In Pursuit of a Realistic and Responsible Ethic of Care, 11 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 83, 86 (2014). Opiophobia is best defined as “an unreasonable fear
of and resultant reluctance to prescribe, administer, or receive opioid analgesics,
even for the relief of severe pain which is unresponsive to other available pain
management strategies.” Rich, supra note 91, at 43.
209. See Rich, supra note 91, at 43. Opiophobia was considered a worldwide
problem; however, its effects were particularly felt in the United States due to the
open War on Drugs. Id.
210. See Baker, supra note 127.
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Admittedly, there was a vast undertreatment of pain by
physicians in the 1980s and 1990s due to opiophobia.211 This led to
many patients needlessly suffering because physicians feared the
patients would become addicted to the pain medicine, even though
opioid therapies were the only known treatment that would work.212
In its response, however, TJC reversed the problem by incentivizing
physicians to overprescribe or risk possible malpractice claims.213 In
order to effectively deter physicians from overprescribing opioids,
TJC should limit its pain management standards to apply only to
those patients who do not have adequate pain relief from nonopioid
therapies. This limitation would likely ease physician concerns that
underprescribing opioids would open them up to malpractice suits,
and there would therefore likely be a significant decrease in the
number of opioid prescriptions.
E.

Analysis of Combative Measures

Over the past few years, both state and federal governments
have become increasingly concerned about the growing opioid
epidemic. There has been significant research nationwide to
determine the best measures to combat opioid abuse. PDMPs and
the implementation of naloxone distribution programs, in
particular, have proven to be extremely effective measures.214
1.

PDMPs

States have responded to the opioid abuse crisis by
implementing PDMPs with the hope that these programs will
significantly decrease instances of opioid abuse.215 As of today, fortynine states have PDMP legislation, including Minnesota.216 The
211. See Goldberg & Rich, supra note 208, at 85.
212. This conclusion is derived from Ben Rich’s definition of opiophobia, which
is a fear to prescribe opioids even where the severe pain is unresponsive to other
known mitigating treatments. See Rich, supra note 91, at 43.
213. See generally Furrow, supra note 193, at 39 n.160 (enumerating TJC’s seven
regulations for managing chronic pain).
214. See generally Volkow, supra note 25 (giving an overview of the federal
government’s efforts to combat opioid abuse and highlighting PDMPs and
naloxone distribution programs).
215. See, e.g., Jacob O’Brien, Note, A Review and Evaluation of Indiana’s Inspect
System and Governing Legislation: Maximizing Potential Impact on Public Health, 10 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 701, 703 (2013).
216. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 152.126 (2016) (Minnesota’s PDMP statute).
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general consensus among the states that have examined the impact
of their PDMPs is that the programs have significantly hindered
patients’ ability to abuse prescription drugs, especially since they
make doctor shopping more readily identifiable.217 This section will
analyze the Minnesota PDMP statute,218 examine a case study of
Indiana’s prescription drug monitoring legislation,219 and compare
the two states’ laws in order to recommend how Minnesota can most
effectively implement its own PDMP.220
a.

Minnesota’s PDMP

The Minnesota Legislature implemented its PDMP through
Minnesota Statutes section 152.126 in an effort to curb opioid
abuse.221 Generally, the statute requires participating dispensers to
submit certain identifying information to the program, such as the
name of the prescriber, the name of the patient, the name of the
drug prescribed, and the date.222 This data is then submitted to the
statewide database, which is controlled by the Minnesota State Board
of Pharmacy.223 That data can then be accessed by permissible
217. O’Brien, supra note 215, at 714.
218. See infra Section III.E.1.a.
219. See infra Section III.E.1.b.
220. See infra Section III.E.1.c.
221. Glenn Howatt, Minnesota’s Drug Registry Aims to Put a Lid on Prescription Drug
Abuse, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 10, 2015, 8:11 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota
-s-drug-registry-aims-to-put-a-lid-on-prescription-drug-abuse/331889251/.
222. See MINN. STAT. § 152.126, subdiv. 4(a) (2016). The fourteen specific
requirements are as follows:
(1) name of the prescriber;
(2) national provider identifier of the prescriber;
(3) name of the dispenser;
(4) national provider identifier of the dispenser;
(5) prescription number;
(6) name of the patient for whom the prescription was written;
(7) address of the patient for whom the prescription was written;
(8) date of birth of the patient for whom the prescription was written;
(9) date the prescription was written;
(10) date the prescription was filled;
(11) name and strength of the controlled substance;
(12) quantity of controlled substance prescribed;
(13) quantity of controlled substance dispensed; and
(14) number of days supply.
Id.
223. Id. § 152.126, subdivs. 1(b), 5(a).
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users—prescribers, dispensers, pharmacists, and patients224—to
identify individuals who either obtain prescriptions from dispensers
in a quantity or frequency that is inconsistent with the general
standards for those substances or present forged or altered
prescriptions for controlled substances.225 It is important to note that
the statute considers possible HIPAA violations by requiring
providers to give notice to patients of their reporting requirements
and grants immunity from liability to any reporter acting in good
faith.226
Minnesota’s PDMP participation requirements have been
subject to debate, resulting in many health providers not
participating in the program at all.227 In 2014, for example, around
30% of the top prescribers in Minnesota did not have a PDMP

224.

The statute specifically identifies twelve permissible users:
(1) a prescriber or an agent or employee of the prescriber to whom
the prescriber has delegated the task of accessing the data . . . ;
(2) a dispenser or an agent or employee of the dispenser to whom
the dispenser has delegated the task of accessing the data . . . ;
(3) a licensed pharmacist who is providing pharmaceutical care for
which access to the data may be necessary . . . ;
(4) an individual who is the recipient of a controlled substance
prescription . . . or a guardian of the individual, parent or guardian of a
minor, or health care agent of the individual acting under a health care
directive . . . ;
(5) personnel or designees of a health-related licensing board . . . or
of the Emergency Medical Services Regulatory Board . . . ;
(6) personnel of the board engaged in the collection, review, and
analysis of controlled substance prescription information . . . ;
(7) authorized personnel of a vendor under contract with the state
of Minnesota who are engaged in the design, implementation,
operation, and maintenance of the prescription monitoring program
...;
(8) federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities acting
pursuant to a valid search warrant;
(9) personnel of the Minnesota health care programs . . . ;
(10) personnel of the Department of Human Services . . . ;
(11) personnel of the health professionals services program . . . ; and
(12) personnel or designees of a health-related licensing board . . . .
Id. § 152.126, subdiv. 6(b).
225. Id. § 152.126, subdiv. 5(a).
226. Id. § 152.126, subdivs. 4(d) (discussing the reporter’s notice requirements
to the patient), 9 (granting the reporter immunity from liability).
227. See Howatt, supra note 221.
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account.228 The most recent PDMP legislation considered this
fractured use problem and required every prescriber across the state
to participate by July 1, 2017.229 It will be interesting to see if
nonparticipating providers will be subject to the statute’s disciplinary
provision.230 The two most common concerns providers have
regarding mandatory participation are the cost of implementation
and the potential diminishing of on patient privacy.231
b.

Indiana’s PDMP

Indiana created a PDMP in 2004, much earlier than when
Minnesota created its program in 2010.232 A 2013 article published
in the Indiana Health Law Review analyzed Indiana’s program and
offered recommendations to maximize its potential.233 Many of the
limitations in Indiana’s program mirror possible limitations in
Minnesota’s program, so Minnesota legislators should learn from
Indiana’s experience when analyzing Minnesota’s own PDMP.
Indiana calls its program INSPECT, and it requires all schedule
II–V drugs to be reported.234 Non-scheduled substances need not be
reported.235 Similar to the Minnesota statute, Indiana’s law limits the
authorized users who can request information from the program,
and the authorized users can easily access the information by simply
searching an individual’s name within the database.236
Overall, the Indiana Health Law Review article concludes that the
Indiana program has been successful in collecting data about
potential prescription drug abuse and has the potential to curb

228. Id.
229. See MINN. STAT. § 152.126, subdiv. 6(c).
230. See generally id. § 152.126, subdiv. 7 (providing that a dispenser who
knowingly fails to distribute information to the board will be subject to disciplinary
action).
231. See Howatt, supra note 221.
232. Compare Minn. STAT. § 152.126 subdiv. 2 (stating that the Minnesota State
Board of Pharmacy shall establish a PDMP by January 1, 2010), with IND. PROF.
LICENSING AGENCY, http://www.in.gov/pla/inspect/2338.htm (last visited May 18,
2017) (stating that INSPECT’S current form was created in 2004). See generally IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-48-7-2.5–17 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. of the 120th
Gen. Assemb.) (describing the INSPECT program).
233. See generally O’Brien, supra note 215.
234. See id. at 715.
235. Id. at 715–16.
236. Id. at 716–18.
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doctor shopping.237 Specifically, the author identifies two positive
aspects of the Indiana program.238 First, the system considers
possible HIPAA violations by limiting both the authorized users of
INSPECT and the amount of patient health data such users may see
when conducting a search.239 Second, it shields practitioners acting
in good faith from liability for authorized entries, which incentivizes
practitioners to make disclosures.240 Still, there is obvious room for
improvement since the number of injuries and deaths arising from
opioid abuse has continued to increase across Indiana.241
The article highlights five areas of INSPECT that should be
changed in order to maximize the program’s potential.242 First,
Indiana should increase the use of interoperability agreements with
other state PDMPs.243 An interoperability agreement allows a state to
share information from its own PDMP with another state’s PDMP,
thereby curbing interstate prescription drug abuse through doctor
shopping.244 Since not all states have effective PDMPs, having an
interoperability agreement with all fifty states would be unrealistic;
however, Indiana could strive for such agreements between states
within the region, since that would most likely be the zone where
Indiana residents would go for interstate doctor shopping.245

237. See id. at 723.
238. Id. at 724.
239. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-7-11.1 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.
of the 120th Gen. Assemb.) (limiting who has access to view INSPECT data);
O’Brien, supra note 215, at 724; see also FAQs, IND. PROF. LICENSING AGENCY,
http://www.in.gov/pla/inspect/2371.htm (last visited May 18, 2017) (suggesting
that the approval for access and other statutory restrictions limit what users see when
conducting a search).
240. O’Brien, supra note 215, at 725.
241. See id.
242. Id. at 728–36 (discussing five recommendations to maximize the
effectiveness of Indiana’s system: (1) increase the number of interoperability
agreements, (2) create a more proactive system, (3) implement independent
evaluation, (4) monitor non-controlled substances, and (5) require practitioner
participation).
243. Id. at 728.
244. See id. at 728–29.
245. See id. Indiana already has interoperability agreements with all bordering
states, creating a great obstacle for interstate doctor shoppers; however, O’Brien
believes that all states within the region should be covered, since it would be feasible
for opioid abusers to drive a little farther to fall outside of an interoperability
agreement. See id. at 729.
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Second, Indiana should develop a more proactive PDMP.246 A
more proactive system would automatically alert authorized users
about a possible abuse problem with a particular patient, as opposed
to a reactive system, where authorized users are not alerted to a
potential problem unless they search for a particular patient.247 The
author admits that no state has yet to develop a fully proactive system
but believes such a system would be possible through analytical
software or similar technology that would flag potential abusers
based on an individual’s characteristics and drug use patterns.248
Third, Indiana should create an independent evaluative entity
that would measure the program’s effectiveness in combating
prescription drug abuse within the state.249 This would comply with
the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws’ (NAMSDL) model
for an effective PDMP.250 An independent evaluative entity would
strengthen a PDMP because it would allow a non-governmental
group to examine the current program, discover possible
shortcomings, and make the program more user-friendly.251
Fourth, Indiana should expand coverage of INSPECT to
monitor the usage of non-scheduled substances, such as “over-thecounter medications and medications that are prescribed to treat
medical conditions such as high blood pressure, diabetes, and
bacterial infections.”252 There are three possible situations where
non-scheduled substances should be monitored: first, where the
drug has a high tendency of addiction or abuse; second, where the
drug “has significant potential for dangerous drug interaction”; and
third, where patients voluntarily agree to have their non-controlled

246. Id.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. Id. at 730.
250. Id. NAMSDL has published what it believes to be a model PDMP law, last
revised in 2015, and many of the subdivisions found in the model PDMP law are
found in both Indiana and Minnesota’s programs. See generally NAT’L ALL. FOR
MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS, MODEL PRESCRIPTION MONITORING PROGRAM ACT (2015),
http://www.namsdl.org/library/A72D4573-0D93-65C4-281BD9DB01418276/.
251. See O’Brien, supra note 215, at 730.
252. Non-Controlled
Substances,
TAKE
BACK
MEDS,
http://www.takebackmeds.org/proper-disposal/non-controlled-substances
(last
visited May 18, 2017); see O’Brien, supra note 215, at 731. This expansion is needed
because any medication can be abused if taken in high enough doses. Roy R. Reeves
et al., Abuse of Medications That Are Theoretically Without Abuse Potential, MEDSCAPE
(2015), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/842222.
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substances monitored to better protect themselves against adverse
drug reactions.253
Fifth, physicians should be required to participate in the
INSPECT program.254 The author concludes that this last limitation
is possibly the greatest barrier to INSPECT realizing its full potential
and that many of the arguments against a mandatory requirement,
such as a diminishing of patient privacy, are unfounded in light of
current data.255 The article ultimately concludes that Indiana’s
INSPECT system is one of the strongest PDMPs in the country but is
still not being used to its full potential.256 With the implementation
of the five suggestions, perhaps Indiana’s prescription drug abuse
problem could come under control.
c.

Is Minnesota’s PDMP Reaching Its Full Potential?

This final section compares Minnesota’s PDMP statute with the
Indiana Health Law Review article’s five recommendations to
maximize the potential of Indiana’s INSPECT system. Minnesota has
already adopted two of the five recommendations made in the
article: evaluation by an independent entity and mandatory
participation in the PDMP for providers.257 However, the other three
recommendations remain pertinent for Minnesota to use its PDMP
program to its full potential.
First, an effective PDMP should have a larger number of
interoperability agreements with different states in order to increase
the effectiveness of abuse monitoring and curb doctor shopping.258
In December 2015, the Minnesota Board of Pharmacy reported that
twenty-two states currently exchange data with Minnesota, including
its bordering states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and
Wisconsin.259 This data is similar to what was found in Indiana, where

253. O’Brien, supra note 215, at 731–32.
254. Id. at 733.
255. Id. at 733–36.
256. See id. at 739.
257. See MINN. STAT. § 152.126, subdiv. 3 (2016) (outlining an independent
evaluating entity for Minnesota’s PDMP); id. § 152.126, subdiv. 6(c) (requiring that
every prescriber who practices in Minnesota maintain an account with the state’s
PDMP by July 1, 2017).
258. See O’Brien, supra note 215, at 728.
259. MELISSA WINGER & BARBARA A. CARTER, MINN. BD. OF PHARM., REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE: INTERSTATE PRESCRIPTION DATA EXCHANGE MN PRESCRIPTION
MONITORING
PROGRAM
3
(2015),
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all border states had entered into interoperability agreements with
the state, but not all states that prescription drug abusers could
potentially reach are covered.260 Nebraska is an example of a state
that, although not bordering Minnesota, is nearby enough that drug
abusers could easily travel there to obtain prescriptions and avoid
detection by Minnesota’s PDMP.261 Minnesota also faces a unique
obstacle since it sits on an international border. The effectiveness of
Minnesota’s PDMP could be increased through additional
interoperability agreements with other states.
On another note, perhaps the federal government should
implement a national PDMP, forgoing the need for interoperability
agreements altogether. A national PDMP could be similar to the
National Practitioner Data Bank (NPBD), which allows medical
professionals to view malpractice payments from physicians.262 A
national program such as this would certainly optimize the federal
government’s ability to monitor prescription drug abuse and limit
geographic disparities in opioid abuse. Further, the federal
government should consider implementing monitoring programs
with international neighbors, such as Canada. This would be
beneficial to states that sit on an international border, like
Minnesota, since many residents could simply walk across the border
to escape PDMP state monitoring.263
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2015/mandated/151330.pdf. The following
states exchange prescription drug monitoring data with Minnesota: Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
260. See O’Brien, supra note 215, at 728–29.
261. As of August 2015, Nebraska does not data share with Minnesota’s PDMP.
See WINGER & CARTER, supra note 259; see also News Release from Doug Peterson,
Neb. Att’y Gen. (Feb. 13, 2017), https://ago.nebraska.gov/sites/ago.nebraska.gov
/files/doc/2017-02-13%20Dose%20of%20Reality%20News%20Release_0.pdf
(announcing a public awareness campaign regarding the dangers of opioid
prescription misuse).
262. See
About
Us,
NAT’L
PRACT.
DATA
BANK,
https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/topNavigation/aboutUs.jsp (last visited May 18, 2017).
263. It should be noted that both Canadian provinces that border Minnesota,
Manitoba and Ontario, do have their own PDMPs. See generally MINISTRY OF HEALTH
& LONG-TERM CARE, NARCOTICS MONITORING SYSTEM (NMS): PHARMACY REFERENCE
MANUAL (2012); Manitoba Prescribing Practices Program (M3P), NAT’L ASS’N PHARMACY
REG. AUTHORITIES (May 2006), http://napra.ca/Content_Files/Files/Manitoba
/current%20web%20site/Manitoba_Prescribing_Practices_Program_May2006.pdf
(outlining Manitoba’s PDMP).
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Second, Minnesota should consider investing in a more
proactive PDMP system. The statutory language of Minnesota
Statutes section 152.126 indicates that the database must be
manually searched in order for a prescriber to see a potential red
flag; in other words, there are no automatic alerts to preemptively
catch drug abusers and potential overdoses.264 Analytical software
should be used to alert users of a potential opioid abuser without
requiring medical providers to perform a manual search. This would
likely result in catching more prescription drug abusers and catching
them sooner.
Minnesota has already implemented the third suggestion from
the Indiana Health Law Review article, an independent evaluative
entity.265 Subdivision three of Minnesota’s PDMP statute creates an
advisory task force consisting of both governmental and nongovernmental representatives.266 The statute outlines the duties of
the task force, which mainly consist of evaluating the program and
interpreting the data.267 In this respect, Minnesota seems to meet
this recommendation for an effective PDMP.

264. Language such as “directly access” seems to indicate a search is required to
obtain the information. See MINN. STAT. § 152.126, subdiv. 6(d) (2016).
265. O’Brien, supra note 215, at 730.
266. See MINN. STAT. § 152.126, subdiv. 3(a). The following entities have at least
one representative appointed to the advisory task force by the Minnesota State
Board of Pharmacy:
(1) the Department of Health;
(2) the Department of Human Services;
(3) each health-related licensing board that licenses prescribers;
(4) a professional medical association, which may include an
association of pain management and chemical dependency specialists;
(5) a professional pharmacy association;
(6) a professional nursing association;
(7) a professional dental association;
(8) a consumer privacy or security advocate;
(9) a consumer or patient rights organization; and
(10) an association of medical examiners and coroners.
Id.
267. See id. § 152.126, subdiv. 3(b).
The advisory task force shall advise the board on the development and
operation of the prescription monitoring program, including, but not
limited to:
(1) technical standards for electronic prescription drug reporting;
(2) proper analysis and interpretation of prescription monitoring
data;
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Fourth, an effective PDMP should expand coverage to allow for
monitoring of non-scheduled substances.268 The Minnesota PDMP
statute currently only requires reporting of scheduled substances.269
Minnesota should consider expanding its program to include nonscheduled drugs that have a high potential for abuse or dangerous
drug interactions and patients who voluntarily agree to have such
information monitored for their own health benefit.270 This
expanded coverage is needed because abuse of non-scheduled
substances is also a problem.271 For example, there have been
numerous reports of abuse of antihistamines, sedatives, and muscle
relaxants.272 Since non-scheduled substances have the potential for
abuse, Minnesota’s own PDMP should monitor those over-thecounter purchases.
Fifth, physicians should be required to participate in the PDMP.
Effective July 1, 2017, all prescribers in Minnesota must register and
maintain an account with the state’s PDMP.273 However, the wording
of the statute might give prescribers a loophole because they are only
required to “register and maintain” an account, not enter
prescription and patient information.274 Further, due to the
unpopularity of the mandatory requirement, it will be interesting to
see if this deadline is in any way enforced.275
In conclusion, much like Indiana’s INSPECT program,
Minnesota’s PDMP is strong and effective, but prescription drug
abuse within the state continues to increase.276 In order to maximize
(3) an evaluation process for the program; and
(4) criteria for the unsolicited provision of prescription monitoring
data by the board to prescribers and dispensers.
Id.
268. See O’Brien, supra note 215, at 731.
269. See MINN. STAT. § 152.126, subdiv. 1(c) (defining controlled substances as
scheduled substances).
270. See O’Brien, supra note 215, at 731–32.
271. See generally Reeves et al., supra note 252 (discussing abuse problems with
non-scheduled substances).
272. See id. (noting a rise in reports of (1) antihistamine abuse, (2) individuals
stating that they could not resist the urge to take sedatives, and (3) emergency
department visits for muscle relaxant abuse).
273. See MINN. STAT. § 152.126, subdiv. 6(c).
274. Id.
275. See Howatt, supra note 221 (discussing how many politicians do not like the
mandatory requirement because of the potential cost and privacy violations).
276. See Collins, supra note 19 (showing that between 1999 and 2014 the number
of deaths as a result of opioid overdoses in Minnesota increased by more than
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the potential of the state’s PDMP, Minnesota should increase
interoperability agreements, develop a more proactive system, and
expand the statute to allow for monitoring of non-scheduled
substances. With these recommendations, hopefully the state’s
PDMP can have an even more positive effect on decreasing opioid
abuse.
2.

Benefits and Costs of Increased Naloxone Availability

Naloxone is a powerful, life-saving drug that helps prevent
overdose deaths from opioids.277 Naloxone is not new, as it has been
used by emergency rooms and emergency medical technicians
(EMT) for decades; however, intranasal administration of naloxone
has allowed laypersons outside the emergency department to
administer the drug.278 Since this administration method is relatively
new, there is little literature documenting laypersons’ use of
naloxone in emergency situations.279 Several barriers do exist to
increased naloxone distribution, “including access to products,
funding and reimbursement, legal barriers, and the need for
education at the level of the patient, the caregiver(s) or family, and
provider.”280 These barriers must be overcome in order to maximize
the potential of increased naloxone distribution. This section will
analyze the benefits and costs of increased naloxone distribution and
then explore how Minnesota is combating potential pitfalls of its
naloxone distribution program.281

500%).
277. See Abby M. Bailey & Daniel P. Wermeling, Naloxone for Opioid Overdose
Prevention: Pharmacists’ Role in Community-Based Practice Settings, 48 ANNALS OF
PHARMACOTHERAPY 601, 601–02 (2014).
278. See id. Traditionally, naloxone has been administered through intravenous,
intramuscular, and subcutaneous ways. Id. at 602. These traditional ways limit who
can administer naloxone, as they are much more invasive and therefore would
require greater care than the new intranasal option. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. Bailey and Wermeling compare many of the issues faced by naloxone
distributers to barriers faced by advocates for increased usage of emergency
contraceptives. Id. This analogy is particularly apposite given the controversial
nature of naloxone distribution and the “moral-hazard and medical-legal issues” it
entails. Id.
281. See infra Section III.E.2.a–c.
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Benefits of Increased Naloxone Distribution

A decrease in opioid overdoses and related deaths is the most
obvious benefit of increased naloxone distribution. An opioid
overdose occurs when the opioid binds to receptors in the brain
stem, essentially causing the body forget to breath, leading to
respiratory failure.282 Naloxone interrupts this process by
introducing an opiate antagonist that can reverse the binding
mechanisms of many opioids.283 But there’s a catch. With naloxone
administration, there is only a brief time period between the start of
the overdose and death, typically one to three hours, when the drug
can effectively reverse the overdose.284 Fortunately, studies have
shown that usually another person witnesses a drug overdose,285 so if
that person has a way to effectively administer naloxone, then he or
she could save a life.
Opponents to increased naloxone distribution might argue that
a witness to an overdose event could just call 911 and the EMTs could
administer the drug. This would obviously be ideal; however,
witnesses usually call 911 as a last resort (only 10% to 56% of the
time) because police often arrive with the 911 response team.286
Many opioid abusers worry about police arrival because of their prior
criminal history.287 Instead of calling 911, witnesses attempt to revive
the victim themselves with dubious home remedies, all the while

282. Daniel Kim et al., Expanded Access to Naloxone: Options for Critical Response to
the Epidemic of Opioid Overdose Mortality, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 402, 403 (2009).
283. Id.
284. Id. Some studies have shown an even smaller window of opportunity for
effective naloxone distribution. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. (citing S. Darke & J. Ross, Overdose Among Heroin Users in Sydney,
Australia: Responses to Overdose, 91 ADDICTION 413 (1996); P.J. Davidson et al., Fatal
Heroin-Related Overdose in San Francisco, 1997–2000: A Case for Targeted Intervention, 80
J. URB. HEALTH 261 (2003); M. Tracy et al., Circumstances of Witnessed Drug Overdose in
New York City: Implications for Intervention, 79 DRUG ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 181
(2005)).
287. See id. (stating that many opioid abusers are on parole or have arrest
warrants against them such that they are understandably disinclined to invite police
involvement). Further, these fears are not unfounded, considering that roughly
42% of those who called 911 for opioid overdoses reported seeing police arrive on
the scene in addition to EMTs. Id. There have also been reports of searches,
interrogations, and the threat of manslaughter charges if the overdose is fatal. Id.
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wasting valuable time to save the unresponsive drug user from a fatal
overdose.288
Instead of expecting witnesses of an overdose to call 911, it
makes more sense to provide them with adequate training to prevent
the victim’s death. Indeed, this idea is strongly supported by drug
users, who would be the ones directly affected by increased naloxone
distribution.289 Studies in both San Francisco and Rhode Island
showed around 90% of drug users wanted to participate in naloxone
training or would want a peer to administer naloxone to them in an
overdose episode.290 Increased distribution would give these drug
users the opportunity to save a life and would more than likely
reduce the amount of opioid deaths.291
b.

Costs of Increased Naloxone Distribution

There are many issues with increasing the distribution of
naloxone, most of which are beyond the scope of this article, such as
logistical issues of insurance coverage or ethical issues relating to
pharmacists’ role in naloxone distribution.292 Perhaps the most
significant legal issue is the potential criminal liability of those who
fail to safely distribute naloxone.293
Some states have confronted this dilemma by expanding the
scope of their Good Samaritan statutes to include provisions
protecting naloxone administrators.294 Good Samaritan laws were a
response to the common-law theory that rescuers were not immune

288. Id. The following are examples of dubious home remedies: “injecting them
with salt, milk, or stimulants like cocaine; immersing them in a cold bath; massaging
their hearts; or deliberately inflicting pain.” Id.
289. See id.
290. Id.
291. See id. (stating that two facts lead to the conclusion that increased
distribution of naloxone would likely lead to fewer overdose deaths: the
effectiveness of a timely naloxone distribution and the high likelihood of witnesses
to an overdose event).
292. Logistical issues include getting the outpatient version of the drug on
provider plans and lobbying for naloxone manufacturers to get on state Medicaid
reimbursement plans. See Bailey & Wermeling, supra note 277, at 604. Ethical issues
in the pharmacists’ role also come into play in two situations: (1) should the
pharmacist be in the role of identifying patients for naloxone distribution, and (2)
should the pharmacist be involved in clinical outcomes and follow-ups, or is their
role limited to education and counseling? See id. at 605.
293. See id. at 604–05.
294. See id.
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from liability for their negligent acts or omissions.295 Since 1959, all
states and the District of Columbia have enacted Good Samaritan
laws, although there are wide variations in the scope of immunity
provided by different states.296 These laws have been controversial,
as many argue they take away restitution for victims of unsuccessful
rescue attempts;297 however, Good Samaritan laws with wide scopes
could be beneficial in providing adequate protection to naloxone
distributors. Unfortunately, not all Good Samaritan laws protect
naloxone administrators,298 as only eighteen states have expanded
their Good Samaritan laws to include naloxone distribution.299
States have also attempted to protect naloxone administrators
through naloxone access laws.300 The protections provided by these
laws vary in scope, from providing immunity for prescribers alone to
extending immunity to laypersons alike.301 As of May 2017, forty-five
states have some form of a naloxone access law.302 Of these forty-five,
295. See Eric A. Brandt, Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A Current
Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303, 304 (1983) (noting that at common law “a rescuer
could be held liable for negligent acts associated with the rescue”).
296. Id. at 303. The laws vary between providing immunity only to physicians
and providing immunity for anyone who provides emergency care. Id.
297. Id. at 306.
298. See DRUG POLICY ALL., STATE LEGISLATION: OVERDOSE PREVENTION (2016),
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet_State%20based
%20Overdose%20Prevention%20Legislation%20%28January%202016%29.pdf.
299. The following are the eighteen states that have Good Samaritan legislation
for naloxone distribution: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
See id.
300. See id.; see also Susan P. Weinstein, Commentary: Naloxone Access and Good
Samaritan Overdose Protection Laws Abound in State Legislatures, PARTNERSHIP FOR DRUGFREE KIDS (June 24, 2015), http://www.drugfree.org/news-service/commentary
-naloxone-access-good-samaritan-overdose-protection-laws-abound-state
-legislatures/ (explaining what Naloxone Access Laws are and why states might
enact them).
301. DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 298.
302. These states have a Naloxone Access Law: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Naloxone
Overdose Prevention Laws, LAW ATLAS PROJECT, http://lawatlas.org/datasets/laws
-regulating-administration-of-naloxone (last visited May 18, 2017).
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twenty-nine states provide immunity from both civil and criminal
liability to laypersons administering naloxone.303
c.

Minnesota Laws on Naloxone Distribution

Minnesota has both a Naloxone Good Samaritan Law and a
Naloxone Access Law.304 Minnesota’s Good Samaritan law permits a
layperson to administer naloxone and provides that if the
administrator believed in good faith the recipient was suffering from
a drug overdose, then the administrator is immune from both civil
and criminal liability.305 The statute also provides immunity from
civil and criminal liability to health care professionals.306 Minnesota’s
303. Those twenty-nine states include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
Notably, none of these states require the layperson administrator or the naloxone
recipient to participate in a naloxone administration program as a condition of
immunity. See id.
304. MINN. STAT. § 604A.04 (2016) (Naloxone Good Samaritan Statute); id.
§ 151.37, subdiv. 12 (Naloxone Access Law). The Naloxone Access Law defines the
individuals who are allowed to administer naloxone, including those trained to
recognize the signs of overdose.
305. The applicable statute reads,
(a) A person who is not a health care professional may possess or
administer an opiate antagonist that is prescribed, dispensed, or
distributed by a licensed health care professional pursuant to
subdivision 3.
(b) A person who is not a health care professional who acts in good faith
in administering an opiate antagonist to another person whom the
person believes in good faith to be suffering a drug overdose is immune
from criminal prosecution for the act and is not liable for any civil
damages for acts or omissions resulting from the act.
Id. § 604A.04, subdiv. 2.
306. The Good Samaritan statute provides for immunity as follows:
A licensed health care professional who is permitted by law to prescribe
an opiate antagonist, if acting in good faith, may directly or by standing
order prescribe, dispense, distribute, or administer an opiate antagonist
to a person without being subject to civil liability or criminal prosecution
for the act. This immunity applies even when the opiate antagonist is
eventually administered in either or both of the following instances: (1)
by someone other than the person to whom it is prescribed; or (2) to
someone other than the person to whom it is prescribed.
Id. § 604A.04, subdiv. 3.

2017]

A LITTLE LESS REGULATION

923

Naloxone Access Law essentially provides additional protection from
civil and criminal liability to both laypersons and health care
professionals.307
With both the Naloxone Good Samaritan Law and the
Naloxone Access Law, ordinary Minnesotans who administer
naloxone to overdose victims need not worry about liability when
administering the drug. Minnesota might consider expanding its
access law to create training programs for naloxone distribution, as
other states have done.308 States should invest in naloxone
distribution training since such training is essential for the drug’s
success, as administrators would need to be comfortable
administering the drug in emergency situations.309
To conclude, naloxone is a powerful drug that has the potential
to save the lives of many opioid overdose victims. In an effort to save
more lives, states have begun distributing naloxone for outpatient
use. To maximize the success of these distribution programs, states
should pass legislation granting immunity to administrators and
invest in product training. With these necessary elements,
widespread naloxone distribution could have a significant impact on
overall opioid overdose deaths.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the successful implementation of PDMPs and naloxone
distribution programs, opioid abuse and overdose death rates
continue to rise.310 Federal initiatives, such as the ACA’s patient
satisfaction surveys and TJC’s patient pain standards, though wellintended, have incentivized physicians to overprescribe, which in
turn has led to higher rates of addiction and substance abuse. In
order to make a significant dent in the prescription drug abuse
epidemic, legislation like the ACA’s patient satisfaction surveys and
TJC’s patient pain standards must be repealed or revised because
they currently incentivize physicians to overprescribe. Since the
ACA’s patient satisfaction surveys and TJC’s patient pain standards
conflict with current state combative measures, such as PDMPs and
naloxone distribution programs, these pieces of federal legislation,
307. See DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 298.
308. States with such programs include Illinois, Maryland, New Mexico, New
York, Vermont, and Virginia. Id.
309. See Bailey & Wermeling, supra note 277, at 604.
310. See Collins, supra note 19.
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regulation, and guidance should either be repealed or revised.
Minnesota has the opportunity to be at the forefront of these
initiatives. Since Minnesota has historically provided a “first-class
healthcare system” to its population,311 it should provide a first-class
opioid abuse initiative as well. These initiatives would be a great
memorial to Minnesotans who have lost their lives to opioid abuse,
such as Prince and Dan Baker, and perhaps other states and the
federal government would look to Minnesota as an example of how
to significantly decrease opioid abuse throughout the country.

311. Andy Slavitt, Commentary, Minnesota Health Care, and Values, Take a Blow in
GOP Bill, STAR TRIB. (May 11, 2017, 6:00 PM), http://www.startribune.com
/minnesota-health-care-and-values-take-a-blow-in-gop-bill/422052663/.
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